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THE USE OF CLOSURE ORDERS AND NOTICES
OF VIOLATION UNDER THE FEDERAL COAL
MINE HEALTH & SAFETY ACT OF 1969-THE
NECESSITY FOR STRINGENT ENFORCEMENT
J. DAVrr MCATEER*
I. BACKGROUND: DEAD MINERS ALWAYS INFLUENCE MINING
LEGISLATION
Most writers place the beginning of the social revolution, that
resulted in the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969,' on November 20, 1968, the date the Consolidation
Coal Company mine near Farmington, West Virginia, exploded
and killed seventy-eight men. However, one experienced industry
observer places the date sometime earlier-on May 10, 1968. On
that date, a mine located near Hominy Falls, West Virginia, ex-
ploded and trapped ten men behind a wall of water. Nine days
later, six of the men came out alive after nearly all hope for them
was abandoned.2
According to Neil Robinson, President of Robinson and Robin-
son Mining Engineers,3 the fact that these men came out alive after
so long, contributed to the public reaction to the later Farmington
disaster. At the Farmington No. 9 mine, newsmen, inspired by the
memory of the miracle of Hominy Falls, stood in front of the
smoking mine portal for nine days, as a horrified American public
watched and hoped each evening, until, after almost two weeks,
the mine was sealed and all was silent. A turning point in history
had been reached. There was no turning back-something had to
be done about safety and health in the coal mines. The "some-
thing" was the 1969 Act.
*A.B., Wheeling College, 1966; J.D., West Virginia University, 1970; Visiting
Professor of Law, West Virginia University, 1974; Attorney for United Mine Work-
ers of America.
This article represents the views of the author and not necessarily those of the
International Union, United Mine Workers of America. The author would also like
to express appreciation for the assistance given by Gincy Everhart, Belinda Hud-
nall, Steve Jacobson, and Rich Trumka in the preparation of this article.
1 83 Stat. 742 (codified 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970)) [hereinafter cited and
referred to as the Act.]
2 UNrrED MINE WORKERS JOURNAL, vol. 79, no. 11, June 1, 1968, at 37.
Interview with Neil Robinson, President of Robinson and Robinson Mining
Engineers, in Charleston, West Virginia, Aug. 20, 1970.
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The chronology of federal government safety legislation has
tracked the calendar of major mine disasters. In 1907, two disasters
(Monongah, West Virginia, 362 deaths; Jacobs Creek, Pennsyl-
vania, 239 deaths)4 triggered the creation, in 1910, of the Bureau
of Mines as a division of the Department of Interior.5 The agency,
however, was given no regulatory authority nor was it authorized
to inspect the mines. In 1941, three separate gas explosions
claimed 199 lives,' and Congress responded by empowering Bureau
inspectors to accompany state inspectors.' Then, in 1952, after 119
miners died in an explosion and fire in West Frankfort, Illinois,8
Congress gave limited authorization to the Bureau of Mines to
inspect and regulate mining?
In 1966, the 1952 Act was amended to include mines with less
than fifteen men as well as a few additional changes,"° but, in
general, the 1952 legislation was the controlling body of law until
December, 1969. In 1968, prior to the Farmington disaster, Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson proposed a new act, but Congress failed to
move on this proposal."
II. THE AcT GENERALLY
The 1969 Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to enforce
interim health and safety standards and to develop and promul-
gate mandatory health and safety standards.'" The Secretary was
to inspect the country's coal mines to ensure that all employers
were complying with the law and standards. 3 To enforce the stan-
dards, a basically simple procedure was established. An inspector
examines a mine or part thereof. If he finds a violation of a manda-
tory health or safety standard, he issues a "notice of violation" or
"closure order," thereby requiring that the violation be abated-in
I U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BULL. No. 586, HISTORICAL SUM-
MARY OF COAL MINE EXPLOSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1810-1958, at 22 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as HISTORICAL SUMMARY].
30 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 22.
55 Stat. 177 (1941) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 451-54 (1970)).
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 22.
66 Stat. 692 (1952) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 472-73 but repealed by 83 Stat.
803 (1969)).
"0 Federal Coal Mine Safety Act Amendments of 1965, 80 Stat. 84 (1966)
[hereinafter referred to as the 1966 Amendments].
S. REP. No. 411, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1969).
,2 30 U.S.C. § 801(g) (1970).
13 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1970).
[Vol. 77
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a period of time if a notice is issued or immediately in the case of
a closure order." A Department of the Interior Mining Enforce-
ment and Safety Administration Assessor then assesses the viola-
tion and determines a penalty of up to ten thousand dollars for
each violation.'5 If the operator willfully violates or refuses to com-
ply with any section 104 order, he may be liable for up to $25,000
or imprisoned for up to one year."6
The operator can contest the violation, order, or fine, and a
public hearing is then held before a Department of the Interior
administrative law judge." His decisions are reviewable by the
Department of the Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals
(hereinafter referred to as the Board), and their decisions are ap-
pealable to the United States Court of Appeals.
The Congress also dealt with the problem of coal workers'
pneumonoconiosis, or black lung, by adopting standards for deter-
mining the existence of the disease,"1 compensations for black lung
victims, 0 a mechanism for removing miners with developing cases
of black lung from high, dusty areas, and limits for the amount of
allowable dust concentrations. The Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare was directed to conduct research in dust control
and other health hazard areas and to develop appropriate health
standards.2'
The Act, the most far reaching in the history of industrial
health and safety at that time, resulted from congressional realiza-
tion that the government agency charged with enforcement of the
law had a dismal record with regard to the improvement of mine
safety. Over the years, it had failed to develop or enforce regula-
tions intended to alleviate unsafe conditions in the mines.
According to Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:
Prior to the Farmington disaster of November 20, there was a
notably unimpressive record by the Department of the Interior
and its Bureau of Mines in respect to improving the health and
safety of the miners. Many of the deficiencies of the 1952 Act
, 30 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
, 30 U.S.C. § 819(a) (1970).
30 U.S.C. § 819(b) (1970).
17 30 U.S.C. § 815 (1970).
I 30 U.S.C. § 816 (1970).
30 U.S.C. §§ 841-46 (1970).
30 U.S.C. §§ 901-36 (1970).
21 30 U.S.C. §§ 951-60 (1970).
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were known years ago, yet little effort has, in the past, been
made by the Bureau or the Department to correct them ...
In the 17 years since the enactment of the Federal Coal Mine
Safety Act, as amended, health and safety has been the step-
child of the Bureau. The primary interest of the Bureau during
this period has been mineral production, including coal. In
some cases, the people involved in the direction of health and
safety have been lethargic and more industry oriented than
miner health and safety oriented.2
While the Committee noted that some improvement had occurred
as a result of the Farmington disaster, it did not believe that the
Bureau of Mines had altered its basic outlook toward mine health
and safety. Thus, Congress constructed the Act in such a way as
to strictly define and expand the responsibility of the Bureau in
the safety and health area.
[Tihe committee is still concerned that not enough attention
is given by the officials of the Department in insuring that the
health and safety functions of the Bureau will be buttressed.
The expanded authority and responsibility found in this bill
demands that these functions be substantially expanded and
improved.?
The Committee also expressed concern as to whether the De-
partment would properly carry out its duties under the law. "The
Committee intends to do whatever it can to assure that greater
efforts will be made to bring redirection to those in the Bureau who
are more production oriented than health and safety oriented. 2 4
Sadly, though, the redirection hoped for by the Committee has not
been realized. The record of enforcement of the 1969 Act can only
be said to be dismal. In absolute figures, deaths have gone down
but have not stablized, and non-fatal accidents have increased,
decreasing only in 1974.
Ironically, the Act's positive impact on the rates of deaths and
injuries has not been the result of strong enforcement. Part of this
effect is obviously attributable to the basic enforcement of a much
more comprehensive law. Standards and regulations under the
1969 Act cover many areas of the mining operation that were not
covered under the 1952 Act as amended. Moreover, there has been
HousE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 91ST CONG., 2D SEss., LBGISLATrVB HIsTORY:
FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY AcT (Comm. Print 1970) 42 [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
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considerable oversight and pressure on the part of congressional
committees and individual members of Congress, such as Con-
gressman Ken Hechler, to prod the Mine Enforcement Safety
Administration (MESA) into carrying out its basic responsibili-
ties. Thus, even though new regulations are not enforced properly,
the fact that they are promulgated at all has some positive effect
on mine safety. In conclusion, while the decrease in coal miners'
deaths since the Act's inception has been substantial, it has
reached a level that should have been attained twenty years ago. "5
The decrease in the numbers of deaths from around 250 per year
in the late sixties to 132 in 1974, does signify improvement, but
there is no indication from the figures that the rate will stabilize.
28
If there are companies that can achieve much higher stan-
dards of safety by committing themselves to obey the law and to
seriously attack the health and safety problems with proper en-
forcement, the unwilling companies could be forced into safe oper-
ation. A MESA chart indicates that there are in fact companies
able to operate relatively safe mines.2 7 While the chart only indi-
cates one year's figures, the pattern is much the same for all the
years since the 1969 Act was passed. Thus, while there has been
improvement, it is not sufficient and, unfortunately, is not due to
stringent enforcement of the Act.




Fatal Per Million Disabling Per Million
Man-Hours Injury Man-Hours
1968 311 1.33 9,639 41.12
1969 203 .85 9,917 41.75
1970 260 1.00 11,552 44.40
1971 181 .71 11,916 46.89
*1972 156 .53 12,332 45.67
*1973 132 .44 11,067 40.48
*1974 132 .43 8,483 29.92
*Preliminary figures, subject to change.
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El. THE Acr SPECIFICALLY
There are two essential provisions that constitute the teeth of
the law: the notices of violations and closure orders 8 and the
penalty assessments.29 Both provisions are intended to put eco-
nomic pressure on the operator of a coal mine to see that he com-
plies with the law and thereby operates his mine safely." This
article deals 6nly with the first of these provisions-closure orders
and notices of violations.
The legislative history of the 1969 Act lays out the intent of
Congress with regard to the method, procedure, and functioning of
the enforcement provisions.
General Inspections
Authorized representatives of the Secretary of the Interior
would be required to make inspections and investigations in
coal mines for the purposes of obtaining information relating to
safety conditions, developing health and safety standards, de-
termining whether a mine is complying with the mandatory
health and safety standards. . . . There must be at least four
inspections of underground coal mines each calendar year, in
addition to spot inspections and other investigations, and most
importantly, the inspector must not provide an advance notice
of these inspections to the mines ...
104(a) Imminent Danger
If an inspector finds that an imminent danger exists in a mine,
he would be required to issue an order requiring the mine opera-
tor to withdraw all workers from the section of the mine where
the danger exists until it is determined by an inspector that the
condition no longer exists.
104(b) Violation
If, upon any inspection, an inspector finds that there has been
a violation of a mandatory health or safety standard, but the
violation has not created an imminent danger, he would allow
the violator a reasonable time to abate the violation. If the
violation is not abated by the end of that period, and if the
inspector does not find that the period should be extended, he
30 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
30 U.S.C. § 819 (1970).
11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 39.
[Vol. 77
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would be required to order a withdrawal of all workers from the
area affected by the violation.
104(c) Unwarrantable Failure
If an inspector fines a violation of a standard that does not cause
an imminent danger, but is of such a nature as could signifi-
cantly and substantially contribute to any mine hazard, and if
he finds that the violation is due to an unwarrantable failure to
comply with the standards, he includes the finding in the no-
tice. During any inspection within ninety days after issuance of
the notice, if an inspector finds another violation which is also
due to an unwarrantable failure of the operator to comply, he
must order the miners withdrawn from the mine.
Once a withdrawal order has been issued in the case of an un-
warrantable failure, the inspector must issue such an order on
subsequent inspections when he finds the existence anywhere in




The 1969 Act is a departure from the normal congressional
procedure in drawing up legislation. It is, to a large extent, specific
as to its purpose as well as its particular provisions. Congress,
concerned that a mandate to the Department of the Interior would
not be carried out in the manner it desired, sought to specify the
responsibility of the Bureau of Mines by determining the principal
provisions of the Act. Possibly because of such specificity, the
litigation as to the substantive aspects of the Act have been
minimal.
A. Gassy v. Non-gassy
The first major challenge to a substantive provision of the Act
came early in 1971. During the congressional debate over the Act,
one of the most contested provisions was the elimination of the
distinction between gassy and non-gassy mines." In the past,
mines had been classified as either gassy or non-gassy; the former
being required to meet higher standards of safety." In the case of




11 478 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1973).
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nation of the gassy/non-gassy distinction. Reliable applied for a
modification of the mandatory safety standard requiring the use
of a methane monitor on certain mining equipment on the grounds
that its mine was non-gassy. The court, referring to the legislative
history of the Act, found.the argument "flawed in every aspect,"
especially the challenge of the gassy/non-gassy distinction."
The court went on to discuss the modification provisions of the
Act, which give the Bureau of Mines some limited authority to
develop, promulgate, and revise improved mandatory safety stan-
dards. 6 The court, referring to the legislative history stated:
The expeditious application of these standards to the entire coal
mining industry necessarily presented a variety of problems,
technical in nature, and it was necessary to give the Secretary
a degree of flexibility to adjust the many detailed requirements
of Title Ill to the particular problems of individual coal mines.
This is the plain purpose of Section 301(c), but it was never
intended by the Congress that modifications thereunder would
be employed to dilute the statutory standards or resurrect the
"gassy/non-gassy" distinction.
The safety standards embodied in Title III of the Act repre-
sent an attempt by the Congress to maximize the protection of
the miners based on the current knowledge and technology of
the industry. These standards, however, are not to be static, but
constantly upgraded to provide increased safety and, when nec-
essary, to meet changes in technology and mining conditions. 7
Thus, Reliable laid to rest the argument over the gassy/non-
gassy distinction. In addition, it reiterated the congressional man-
date prohibiting the Secretary from diluting the statutory stan-
dards and required thathe constantly upgrade the standards to
provide increased safety.
B. Scope and Coverage-Interstate Commerce
The scope of the Act was, at the time of its passage, the broad-
est legislation ever enacted to deal with industrial health and
safety problems. The mines subject to the Act as stated by Con-
gress in section 4 included "[e]ach coal mine, the products of
which enter commerce, or the operations or products of which af-
Id. at 257.
30 U.S.C. § 811 (1970).
478 F.2d at 262.
[Vol. 77
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fect commerce, and each operator of such mine, and every miner
in such mine shall be subject to the provisions of this Act."38
A challenge to this provision was made in Morton v. Bloom.39
A one-man mine operator denied federal inspectors the right to
enter and inspect his mine on the grounds that he did not fall
within the coverage of the 1969 Act because his coal was sold
totally intrastate and "[n]either the operations of nor the coal
produced by his mine affect[ed] commerce." The court believed
".. . that it was not a part of the legislative intent of Congress to
subjugate a one-man owner/operated coal mine to the require-
ments of theAct."' Essentially then, the Court exempted this
mine on the grounds that it did not affect interstate commerce.4 '
This decision has had little effect on the enforcement of the Act,
primarily because of its limited application and also because of
case law development in the area of interstate commerce. "
A more crucial question of scope coverage that has never been
litigated is whether the Department was given responsibility for
inspecting and controlling gob piles and coal waste dams or
embankments. After the collapse of the gob coal waste dam on
February 26, 1972, along Buffalo Creek in Logan County, West
Virginia, the Department of the Interior denied that the regulation
of such piles and dams was its responsibility, even though for a
short period prior to the disaster, it had published regulations
concerning their control and inspection. 3 However, at the present
time, MESA does assume responsibility for inspecting, monitor-
ing, and controlling such structures and has promulgated new
regulations.
C. Unconstitutionally Vague
A more serious challenge to the Act arose in United States v.
Consolidation Coal Co.44 This case was the first criminal prosecu-
tion brought under section 109(b) of the Act." The defendants
30 U.S.C. § 803 (1970).
373 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
"Id. at 798.
" Id. at 799.
" See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
3 Hearings on Buffalo Creek Disaster Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 857.
" 504 F.2d 1330 (6th Cir. 1974).
5 30 U.S.C. § 819(b) (1970).
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attacked the section of the Act relating to roof support as being
unconstitutionally vague. The facts of this case bear considera-
tion.46 The court declared "that Section 862(a) supra, is not uncon-
stitutionally vague, that it defines the offenses charged in the in-
formation with certainty.....
An additional issue was presented which bears directly on the
question of the limitations of the Act. The defendants challenged
the interpretation of section 109(b) relating to a criminal offense:
Any operator who willfully violates a mandatory health or
safety standard, or knowingly violates or fails or refuses to com-
ply with any order issued under section 104 of this title, or any
order incorporated in a final decision issued under this title
except an order incorporated in a decision under subsection (a)
of this section or section 110(b)(2) of this title, shall, upon con-
viction, be punished by a fine of not more than $25,000, or by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both, . ... 1
The question raised by the defendants was as to the interpretation
of the word "willful." The court concluded that "[t]he statute
uses the term 'willfully violates.' We are of the opinion that this
would contemplate an affirmative act either of commission or
omission, not merely the careless omission of a duty."49
This case stands for the principle that this particular safety
standard is not unconstitutionally vague, and one can reasonably
conclude that other safety standards established by Congress
48 Thomas Michael Ball was killed on June 14, 1972, in a roof fall accident in
a Consolidation Coal Company mine. The MESA report of the accident clearly lays
out the facts of the accident, in listing what the investigator believed to be some of
the causes:
(2) Thomas Michael Ball (victim) having never received formal course
of inspection designed to train him in the performance of his duties as a
shotfirer and timberman.
(3) The victim with only 12 days underground mining experience being
permitted to work alone while installing temporary roof support in face
areas.
(4) Management's failure to enforce the company's approved roof con-
trol plan and other policies designed to eliminate substandard conditions
and practices which result in roof fall accidents.
Report of Fatal Coal Mine Roof Fall Accident-Franklin #25 Mine, Hanna Coal
Co., Division of Consolidation Coal Co., New Athens, Ohio, June 14, 1972, by
Federal Mine Inspector Gerald Young.
'7 504 F.2d at 1332.
30 U.S.C. § 819(b) (1970).
504 F.2d at 1335.
[Vol. 77
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would withstand such a challenge. Also, the decision sets the stan-
dard for a "willful violation," requiring a knowing and purposeful
act. However, the Sixth Circuit, the decision against Consolidation
Coal Co. was reversed and remanded to the District Court for
retrial, and the conviction against appellant Kidd, the section fore-
man, was vacated for failure to show that he knowingly authorized
or ordered the violations." In April, 1975, the retrial as to Consoli-
dation Coal Company was dismissed on Company motion after the
presentation of the government's evidence."
V. ENFORCEMENT
While the enforcement procedures have been listed, it may be
helpful to restate them in terms they are commonly referred to:
104(a): Imminent Danger
104(b): Notice of Violation of Mandatory Health and Safety
Standard (Non-imminent danger)
104(c)(1) and 104(c)(2): Unwarrantable Failure: "Notice" and
Withdrawal Order
These procedures, being the principle enforcement mechanisms of
the Act, are the most frequently litigated. Although the vast ma-
jority of the litigation is within the Department of the Interior, a
few cases have reached the federal courts.
A. Imminent Danger Closure Orders
Section 104(a) contains the single most powerful remedy pro-
vided for by the Act.2 If an inspector finds an imminent danger,
he can immediately close the mine or section affected. This direct
application of economic pressure is considered the most potent
provision of the Act. On 6,623 occasions since March 30, 1970,
federal inspectors have issued imminent danger withdrawal or-
ders. 3 On an average, every thirty-ninth time an inspector enters
a mine, an imminent danger closure order for all or part of the
mine is issued. 4 In 1974 alone, 1,369 section 104(a) imminent dan-
" Id.
,Interview with Clerk of Court, Fed. District Court, for Northern Dist. of
Ohio, May 11, 1975.
52 30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1970).
Statistics of 104(a) closures from March 30, 1970 to December 31, 1974,
received from Vern Stevens, Congressional Liaison Officer of MESA in Whshington,
D.C., April 21, 1975 [hereinafter referred to as Statistics].
uId.
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ger orders were issued. Because no statistical breakdown regarding
the number of applications for review of section 104(a) orders or
their disposition thereof are available, it is difficult to analyze
these figures. One is simply forced to conclude that imminent dan-
ger does continue to exist in America's mines, and the individual
miner is imperiled each working day, notwithstanding the exist-
ence of the Act.
As might be expected, there has been a multitude of litigation
under this section, particularly with regard to the meaning of
"imminent danger." The cases have, for the most part, been re-
solved in the Department of the Interior's administrative tribunal.
However, two major cases which seek review of imminent danger
withdrawal orders are pending in federal court.
The Act defines "imminent danger" as "[t]he existence of
any condition or practice in a coal mine which could reasonably
be expected to cause death or serious physical harm before such
condition or practice can be abated.""
The first federal court challenge to an imminent danger order
came from Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Interior Board of Mine
Operations Appeals." In this case an imminent danger closure
order had been issued at Eastern's Rachel mine as a result of an
accumulation of debris in a mine passage and two loose roof bolts.
Eastern, in an apparent attempt to avoid the 104(a) withdrawal
order, voluntarily withdrew the miners from the affected mine
until the conditions were corrected, prior to the issuance of the
order." The Court affirmed the Secretary's holding as follows:
[A]n imminent danger exists when the condition or practice
observed could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious
physical harm to a miner if normal mining operations were
permitted to proceed in the area before the dangerous condition
is eliminated.s
Thus, there is no requirement that miners actually be present for
an imminent danger to exist and a section 104(a) order to be is-
sued.
In the second major case concerning imminent danger, the
court established .a standard for determining imminentness. In
- 30 U.S.C. § 802(j) (1970).
0 491 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1974).
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Freeman Coal Mining Co. v. Interior Board of Mine Operations
Appeals," float coal dust accumulated along an operating under-
ground belt haulageway in a mine with a history of releasing meth-
ane gas. A section 104(a) order was issued. The court first dealt
with the issue of mootness, which was raised by the fact that the
withdrawal order was effective for only twenty-six hours, and it
had been issued and had expired sometime prior to the application
for review.
Holding that the case was not moot, the court reasoned that
the withdrawal order could quite conceivably have an effect on
other proceedings under the Act, i.e., the civil penalty assessment,
especially in determining the amount of penalty." The Seventh
Circuit, citing Eastern, stated that "[tihe issuance of a with-
drawal order is a factor bearing upon the gravity of a violation, and
its validity or the correctness of the factual basis on which it rests
may not be relitigated in a [civil penalty] proceeding.""1
Secondly, the court established the test for determing an
imminent danger. In following the Board's construction of "immi-
nent danger" the court stated that it is
a situation in which a reasonable man would estimate that, if
normal operations designed to extract coal in the disputed area
should proceed, it is at least just as probable as not that the
feared accident or disaster would occur before elimination of the
danger.
[A]n imminent threat is one which does not necessarily come
to fruition but the reasonable likelihood that it may, particu-
larly when the result could well be disastrous, is sufficient to
make the impending threat virtually an immediate one.62
Thus, a probability test of fifty-fifty, just as probable as not, has
been established for the question of imminent danger.
In the most recent development regarding imminent danger,
Old Ben Coal Corporation has filed an appeal in the Seventh Cir-
cuit on three cases concerning imminent danger closure orders"3
and has proposed that the probability test be one in sixty-four.




" Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, Appeal Nos.
74-1654, 74-1655, 74-1656, 7th Cir.
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While it is impossible to predict the outcome, it would appear that
in the face of the Freeman decision, the chances of establishing
such a test are unlikely, given the fact that the miner is the one
exposed to the consequence of such a test.
Old Ben raises two issues directly in these cases: first, a proce-
dural issue concerning the burden of proof in the review proceed-
ings and, second, whether there were conditions sufficient to war-
rant the issuance of an imminent danger closure order in the three
cases under consideration. 4 However, Old Ben appears to raise one
issue indirectly, that may well be the real question it wishes to
address. That issue is the abuse of discretion by inspectors in issu-
ing closure orders. According to Old Ben, "this appeal involves not
just three episodes of questionable governmental conduct, but
rather, a panorama of abuse in the implementation of Federal
Law."
65
The procedural issue of burden of proof raised by Old Ben does
not appear on its face to present a serious question for considera-
tion. The second issue of whether there was a basis in law or fact
to warrant the issuance of imminent danger closure orders contains
several sub-arguments, including the proper interpretation of the
imminent danger provision of the Act, the use of imminent danger
closure orders as an enforcement tool, and the denial of due process
by use of the imminent danger section. 6
In essence, each of these arguments has as its basis the ques-
tion of abuse of power by inspectors. Old Ben, in support of this
allegation, cites the drastic number of section 104(a) imminent
danger orders issued in 1972 (1,300). In addition, Old Ben asserts
that in nearly 1,500 other instances, closure orders were issued
under related provisions of the Act. 7 However, during that same
year, 156 men were killed in the mines, and 12,332 men disabled
by injury. Combining the number of deaths and injuries, the total
is 12,488. On 12,488 occasions then, there existed provable immi-
nent danger which resulted in death or physical harm. Thus, on
these occasions, the definition of imminent danger, as set out in
the Act, 8 was met. The number 1,300, cited by Old Ben as being
drastic closures, is drastically low, given the number of accidents
1, Id., Brief for Petitioner at 3.
" Id., Brief for Petitioner at 1.
" Id., Brief for Petitioner at 14.
', Id., Brief for Petitioner at 1.
30 U.S.C. § 802(j) (1970).
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and the number of deaths and injuries. Using this argument, Old
Ben's allegations are easily dismissed.
An additional development in the use of section 104(a) orders
that has not reached Federal Court, but which is of major signifi-
cance, is the question of the use of imminent danger orders follow-
ing a fatal or serious non-fatal accident. During the first several
years following the passage of the Act, federal inspectors issued
section 104(a) withdrawal orders as a matter of course upon arriv-
ing at the scene of a fatal or serious non-fatal accident. The order
would stay in effect until the investigation of the accident was
completed and in many instances until an inspection of the entire
mine was completed. The principle behind this action was that a
serious accident was sufficient evidence of an imminent danger,
requiring investigation of that cause as well as any other similar
conditions or similar types of machines, and so forth.
On several occasions, operators, most notably Eastern Asso-
ciated Coal Corporation, have contested the issuance of a section
104(a) orders. In a case involving a fatality, the Interior Board of
Mine Operations Appeals held that the issuance of such a with-
drawal order was incorrect and that an order should have been
issued under section 103,69 the accident investigation provision.
MESA inspectors now issue section 103 orders after a fatality.
MESA's failure to make an appeal points out their lack of
aggressiveness in carrying out the Act. The consequence of this
failure, and of the changed procedure, are many. First, as was
indicated in Freeman," the issuance of a 104(a) withdrawal order
has a direct bearing on the amount of penalty assessed for the
violation, since it is considered by the Secretary in determining the
gravity of the violation.
Second, the use of section 103 rather than section 104(a) has
a direct bearing on the payment of time lost to the miners. Under
the current procedure, if a section 103 order is issued, a miner is
not entitled to payment for time lost even if the accident and
subsequent layoff are purely the fault of the mine operator.
Most important is the attitude that a company position op-
posing the 104(a) order reflects-after a serious non-fatal accident
occurs or the miner lies dead after a fatal accident-that the immi-
30 U.S.C. §§ 813(e) & (f) (1970).
TO 504 F.2d at 743.
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nent danger clearly exists, that it may have passed, or that it just
as likely could remain. The 104(a) order is used to remove every
man from the situation and freeze the scene so that no further
harm could befall anyone, and, yet, Eastern Associated Coal Cor-
poration, among others, takes and holds the position that it is best
to cut the losses and move on, producing coal.
B. Notification of Violation and Closure Orders for Failure to
Abate
Section 104(b) 71 is the most commonly used of the enforce-
ment provisions, and it results in the least serious consequences.
It is, in the notice aspect, the inspector's warning ticket, and in
the order aspect, the minimum parking fine. It operates simply:
A notice of violation is issued; it is then either extended or
abated, or an order of withdrawal for failure to abate is issued.
The assessments and civil penalties which result from these viola-
tions are generally the least expensive and are most frequently
evaded or dismissed. Logically, then, section 104(b) can be divided
into two parts-notices and orders.
Notices constitute the major business of the inspectors. From
March 30, 1970, to December 31, 1974, there have been 330,559
notices of violations of mandatory health and safety standards."
During that same time, there have been 264,144 inspections, 3
meaning that on every inspection the inspector finds, on the aver-
age, at least 1.25 violations per mine. In 1974, with 78,996 inspec-
tions, inspectors wrote 81,154 notices of violations." The ratio of
notices of violations to inspections has only slightly improved over
the four-year period that the Act has been in effect. In the jargon
of criminal law, the mine operators' rate of recidivism is abyssal.
However, even more disturbing than the rate of inspections to
notices is the rate of notices to orders. In 1974, when 81,15411 no-
tices were issued under section 104(b), 6 on 1,947 occasions,7 the
inspector was forced to issue an order to force abatement. No sta-
tistics were available as to the number of extensions granted, but
11 30 U.S.C. § 814(b) (1970).




71 30 U.S.C. § 814(b) (1970).
7 Statistics, supra note 53.
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it is common practice to grant an initial minimum thirty day ex-
tension and a second extension ranging from fifteen to twenty
days" before taking the serious step of issuing an order, especially
under section 104(b) because of the less serious nature of the condi-
tion. But on nearly two thousand occasions (usually after a mini-
mum of seventy-five days-the normal procedure being thirty days
on notice, forty-five days on two extensions)," the inspector was
forced to issue a withdrawal order under section 104(b) generally
for a less serious matter because of the operator's recalcitrance. An
attitude of compliance does not appear too prevalent among the
operators when, after an inspector issues a notice under 104(b), he
must issue an order every forty times to withdraw the miners to
force an operator to abate a violation of what are generally less
serious problems requiring little effort to abate.
From the standpoint of litigation, notices of violation are a
very minor consideration. The single appeal by the operator or
representative of the miner is -an application of review as to the
reasonableness of the time for abatement. In Lucas v. Morton,"0 the
court, agreeing with the Board, concluded that while section
105(a)8' provides only for appeal on the reasonableness of time set
out in the notice of violation as a proper subject of review, this
appeal must, by necessity, include the fact of violation itself." The
Board recognized the problem of denial of due process but resolved
it by reference to the expedited proceedings available to the opera-
tor. Furthermore, the Board referred to section 105(d),1 which
prohibits the granting of temporary relief from notices issued
under sections 104(b) or (i) of the Act. While this provision appears
to deny due process, the court in Lucas referred to section 104(g),
which provides for modification or termination by an authorized
representative of the Secretary of a notice or order issued pursuant
to section 104.11
Modification, as the court concluded, may consist of extend-
ing the time of abatement until after a hearing on the notice. 5
70 Interview with MESA Mine Inspector Lindsay Kirk, in Washington, D.C.,
May 4, 1975.
Id.
358 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
" 30 U.S.C. § 815(a) (1970).
12 358 F. Supp. at 903.
30 U.S.C. § 815(d) (1970).
0 358 F. Supp. at 904.
'Id.
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Because of the nearly automatic nature of the granting of exten-
sions, no significant litigation either in the federal courts or the
administrative tribunal exists regarding notices.
As to orders under section 104(b), there is a substantial
amount of litigation in the administrative tribunal within the De-
partment of the Interior, primarily relating to disputes over facts
and technical questions. The only federal case resulting from sec-
tion 104(b) closure orders, is Lucas v. Morton.8 In this case, the
operator challenged the constitutionality of the Act provision on
the grounds of lack of reviewability, as an inspector is allowed to
shut down the mine on a withdrawal order after a notice of viola-
tion but before the operator has an opportunity to contest the
notice of violation at a hearing. The operator contended that such
a procedure constituted a denial of elemental due process, by deny-
ing the opportunity to be heard before a penalty is inflicted-the
closing of the mine and the halting of coal production. The court
rejected the plaintiff's argument by noting that the Act requires
appeals from section 104(b) notices to be timely (section 105(a)),8 1
and that the Act prohibits temporary relief from notices under
section 105(d). 8 Moreover, the Act also provides for an expedited
review process." Finally, the court surmised that the time for
abatement would be extended until after the review proceedings
were completed.
C. Unwarrantable Failure Closure Orders
The unwarrantable failure orders under sections 104(c)(1) and
104(c)(2) ,1 were intended to counteract the dangerous attitude of
operators with regard to mining health and safety. These two pro-
visions deal with the problems of repeated and unwarranted viola-
tions of mandatory safety and health standards-violations which
could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and
effect of a mine health and safety hazard but which do not consti-
tute an imminent danger. In 1974, there were 1,438 section 104(c)
closure orders and, since theAct's passage, there have been 3,432
such closures.2
" Supra note 82.
30 U.S.C. § 815(a) (1970).
30 U.S.C. § 815(d) (1970).
358 F. Supp. at 904.
90 Id.
1, 30 U.S.C. §§ 814(c)(1) & (2) (1970).
22 Statistics, supra note 53.
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While these figures are not conclusive, they do indicate that
inspectors in the first few years of the Act did not use 104(c)93
closure orders. Quite possibly because of the complex nature of this
provision, inspectors have stayed away from it.
The 1969 Act provides in section 104(c)(1):
If, upon any inspection of a coal mine, an authorized
representative of the Secretary finds that there has been a viola-
tion of any mandatory health or safety standard, and if he also
finds that while the conditions created by such violation do not
cause imminent danger, such violation is of such nature as
could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause
and effect of a mine safety or health hazard, and if he finds such
violation to be caused by an unwarrantable failure of such oper-
ator to comply with such mandatory health or safety standards;
he shall include such finding in any notice given to the operator
under this Act. If, during the same inspection or any subsequent
inspection of such mine within ninety days after the issuance
of such notice, an authorized representative of the Secretary
finds another violation of any mandatory health or safety stan-
dard and finds such violation to be also caused by an unwar-
rantable failure of such operator to so comply, he shall forthwith
issue an order requiring the operator to cause all persons in the
area affected by such violation, except those persons referred to
in subsection (d) of this section, to be withdrawn from, and to
be prohibited from entering, such area until an authorized rep-
resentative of the Secretary determines that such violation has
been abated."
The Board of Mine Operation Appeals has dealt with several major
challenges regarding this provision, and while some issues have
been resolved, this section remains one of the most difficult to
interpret.
1. How It Works
When an inspector finds a violation of any mandatory health
or safety standard, even though it may not create an imminent
danger, the violation could significantly and substantially contrib-
ute to the cause and effect of a safety or health hazard and could
be caused by an unwarrantable failure of the operator to comply
with the standard. The inspector shall include such findings in any
,1 Between March 30, 1970, and December 31, 1973, only 1,994 section 104(c)
closure orders were issued. Statistics, supra note 53.
" 30 U.S.C. § 814(c)(1) (1970).
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notice he gives the operator. If during the same inspection or any
subsequent inspection occurring within ninety days the inspector
finds another violation of any standard also caused by an unwar-
rantable failure, he shall issue a withdrawal order until the viola-
tion is abated." The Board in Eastern Associated Coal Corp." and
Zeigler Coal Co.9" dealt with several major issues raised under this
subsection.
2. Notice Reviewability
In Zeigler the Board took up, among other items, the issue of
whether a "notice" issued under a section 104(c) (1) unwarrantable
failure is reviewable under section 105(a).1 While there is no provi-
sion in section 104(c) for the issuance of a "notice," the section
does authorize the inspector to insert his findings as to 104(c)
violations into any notice issued under the Act.
In the Zeigler case, the Board considered whether a 104(c)
notice was reviewable. Referring to section 105(a) of the Act, which
prohibits review of notices to sections 104(b) or 104(i),11 the Board
concluded that ". . . [t]he validity of a Section 104(c)(1) notice
by itself is not subject to challenge at the initiation of the operator
by Application for Review."'' 0 The Board went on to say, however,
that the operator was not totally foreclosed from contesting the
validity of a section 104(c)(1) notice as an incident of the review
of the withdrawal order. Reasoning that when a 104(c) order is
challenged, the validity of the underlying 104(c) notice, as well as
its existence, may be challenged.''
11 30 U.S.C. § 814(c) (1970).
26 3 IBMA 331, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. 18,706
(1974).
3 IBMA 448, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. 19,131
(1974).
" 30 U.S.C. § 815(a) (1970).
30 U.S.C. § 815(a)(1) in pertinent part reads:
An operator issued an order pursuant to the provisions of section 104 of
this title . . . may apply to the Secretary for review of the order within
thirty days of receipt thereof. . . .An operator issued a notice pursuant
to section 104(b) or (i) of this title, . . . may, if he believes that the period
of time fixed in such notice for the abatement of the violation is unreason-
able, apply to the Secretary for review of the notice within thirty days of
the receipt thereof.
11 Ziegler Coal Co., 3 IBMA at 455, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety &
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C. Significantly and Substantially
A second substantive issue raised in Zeigler' and dealt with
earlier in Eastern"0 3 concerns the kind of violation which "signifi-
cantly and substantially contributes to the cause and effect of a
mine safety or health hazard." More specifically, the issue is what
is the degree of gravity required to make a violation a significant
or substantial contributor to the cause and effect of a mine safety
or health hazard?
In Eastern the Board set out the test that a violation must ".
significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and ef-
fect of a mine safety or health hazard in section 104(c) referred
to violations posing a probable risk of serious bodily harm or
death and that an inspector's conclusion to that effect was to
be evaluated by the traditional, objective standard of the rea-
sonable man."'4
This same test was reaffirmed by the Board in Zeigler ' 5 and is
almost exactly the standard set for a 104(a) imminent danger. In
Freeman, an imminent danger is
".. . a situation in which a reasonable man would estimate
that, if normal operations designed to extract coal in the dis-
puted area should proceed, it is at least just as probable as not
that the feared accident or disaster would occur before elimina-
tion of the danger."'0 6
A probability test thus exists for both-for determining what is an
imminently dangerous condition and for determining what kinds
of violations can be considered to significantly and substantially
contribute to the cause and effect of a safety or health hazard.
However, the Board's decision clearly is in conflict with the
very language of the Act itself. Section 104(c)(1) language specifi-
cally lessens the requirements for a 104(c) notice by eliminating
the imminent danger conditions standard, which mandates a
104(a) order if a violation causes an imminent danger,"7 and by
102 Id.
10 Eastern Associated Coal Corp. supra note 98.
,0, Id. at 355, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,603
(emphasis added).
05 Ziegler Coal Co., 3 IBMA at 461, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety &
Health Dec. at 22,855.
0I Freeman Coal Mining Co. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operation Appeals, 504
F.2d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
1" 30 U.S.C. § 814(c)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
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setting a second standard, requiring a violation to be "of such
nature as could significantly and substantially contribute to the
cause and effect of a mine safety or health hazard."'' 8 Even the
choice of the condition to be avoided-a hazard rather than a
danger-infers a lesser problem. While the legislative history of the
1969 Act does not enlighten the intent of Congress on this particu-
lar matter, the evolution of this provision from the 1966 Amend-
ments"0 9 to the 1969 Act lends weight to the argument that a lesser
standard than imminent danger was contemplated. Under the
1966 provisions, sections 203(d)(1) and (2), a similar structure ex-
isted; however, the violation was to have been of such a nature
"[a]s could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause
of effect of a mine explosion, mine fire, mine inundation or man-
trip or man-hoist accident." ' The change from the disaster type
language in 1966 to a "safety or health hazard" in the 1969 Act
would seem to indicate the intentions of the authors to broaden the
area protected and to expand the coverage from simply a disaster-
type danger to a hazard. More on point, however, the legislative
history of the 1966 Act indicates that even under those provisions,
the concept behind the unwarrantable failure provision was broad
and not directed toward the danger or gravity of the violation, but
was directed toward the attitude of the operator.
The unwarrantable failure of an operator to comply with the
provisions of section 209 is intended to mean a violation which
occurs because of a lack of due diligence, or because of indiffer-
ence or less than reasonable care on the part of the operator."'
A House Report continues to clearly specify the intent:
The purpose of the amendatory language of new subsection
203(d) is to provide the Bureau of Mine's inspectors with in-
creased powers to deal with recurrent or repeated violations of
section 209, which the inspector reasonably believes to be a
result of an indifferent, heedless, irresponsible, or careless atti-
tude or course of behavior on the part of the operator."'
Finally, the 1966 legislative history deals with the question of
minor and technical violations.
At the same time in recognition of the fact that minor technical
''Id.
202 1966 Amendments, supra note 10, at § 203(d).
"' Id.
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violations of section 209 do occur, and will occur, despite consci-
entious efforts of operators to prevent them, it is deemed unnec-
essarily punitive to provide for the mandatory shutting down of
mines, or the mandatory withdrawal of men from the mines,
where violations of section 209 occur without any lack of dili-
gence or due care on the part of the operator.1
3
As is apparent from the legislative history, Congress in 1965
was dealing with the attitude of the operator and not the gravity
of the violation, even though violations were limited to five
disaster-type categories. When the 1969 Act broadened this area
to cover health and safety standards, via section 104(c) it was
intended to deal with the question of attitude, not one of gravity.
Thus, even a minor violation, that could significantly and substan-
tially contribute to the cause and effect of a mine safety or health
hazard and is caused by an unwarrantable failure of the operator,
could cause the 104(c) provision to be put into effect, primarily
attacking the operator's attitude.
Yet in Eastern the Board determined that a section 104(c)
violation occurred ". . . if the evidence shows that the conditions
or practice cited as a violation posed a probable risk of serious
bodily harm or death." ' To reach its conclusion, the Board devel-
oped a rational test that is worth reviewing. Comparing the first
three subsections of section 104, the Board concluded by restricting
104(c) as follows:
By comparison, conditions or practices subject to subsection
104(c) treatment, that is, notice and then closure and continu-
ing liability to closure, are restricted as befits the serious conse-
quences of employing such strong enforcement tools. Consider-
ing its sequential nature, its explicit restriction to infractions of
the mandatory standard, and its reference in paragraph (1)
requiring the inspector to find no imminent danger, we are of
the opinion that section 104(c) has within its ambit conditions
or practices constituting violations, which pose a probable risk
of serious bodily harm or death short of imminent danger and
where there is a degree of fault, greater than ordinary negli-
gence, which may be aggravated by repetition."'
Thus, with no apparent legislative or regulatory foundation
" Id. (emphasis added).
" Eastern Associated Coal Corp., supra note 98, at 355, 1974-1975 CCH Occu-
pational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,604.
"I Id. at 349, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,602
(emphasis added).
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the Board restricted section 104(c)'s application to a probable risk
of death or serious bodily harm. For justification, the Board cited
the section 104(c)(1), stating that "the Congress provided much
the same description of the sweep of section 104(c) in its express
enumeration of the findings an inspector must make in a 104(c)(1)
notice of violation."'' 6 But it is difficult to find the similarity of
description of the sweep to which the Board referred, since the
language of the Act and the Board's language on its face appear
to be directly opposite. The Act states that "[a] violation of any
mandatory health or safety standard" ' 7 is restricted only to those
not causing an imminent danger. Yet, the Board restricted a viola-
tion to a probable risk of serious bodily harm or death. No two
views are as dissimilar as these.
Several paragraphs later in Eastern, the Board reversed itself
as to the clarity of the congressional description of the sweep of
section 104(c):
In absence of clear Congressional direction to the contrary, we
decline to adopt an interpretation of section 104(c) which might
encourage indiscriminate use of the closure order sanction with-
out any concomitant health or safety benefit."'
Indeed, the Board in Ziegler continued to attempt to explain its
unique approach.
In Eastern, supra, we sought to interpret the ambiguous lan-
guage of section 104(c) so that its enforcement would harmonize
with the administration of other enforcement tools provided to
the Secretary in the Act and would effectuate the Congressional
purposes we understood them. We particularly made an effort
to avoid any interpretation which carried the potential for ab-
surd results."'
It appears that the Board, in attempting to avoid absurdity
and in avoiding an as yet unsupported indiscriminate use danger,
doth protest too much. It went to great lengths to rationalize its
position, and, in an effort to avoid absurd results, completely disre-
garded the language of section 104(c).
Id. at 350, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,602.
,, 30 U.S.C. § 814(c) (1970).
,, Eastern Associated Coal Corp., supra note 98, at 353, 1974-1975 CCH
Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,603 (emphasis added).
"' Ziegler Coal Co., supra note 99, at 460, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety
& Health Dec. at 22,855 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 77
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The Board erred in restricting section 104(c)(1) to only those
violations of a mandatory standard which pose a probable risk of
serious bodily harm or death. This interpretation is in direct con-
flict with the clear language of the Act, and there is no 1969 legisla-
tive history to support such a position. In fact, the 1966 legislative
history and the expansion of the coverage in the 1969 redraft of this
provision are contrary to the finding of the Board.
4. Unwarrantable Failure
The Board continued in Eastern to deal with section 104(c) by
developing the definition of "unwarrantable failure" as follows:
An inspector is justified in finding an unwarrantable failure to
comply with a mandatory health or safety standard, pursuant
to section 104(c) of the Act, where the evidence shows that the
operator intentionally or knowingly failed to abate a violation
or demonstrated a reckless disregard for the health and safety
of miners.2
Appearing to read the congressional collective mind, the Board
stated:
Since the Congress deliberately omitted any definition of the
phrase "unwarrantable failure to comply," it is apparent that
the legislators left the task of investing that concept with mean-
ing to the Secretary and his lawful delegates, to be performed
on a case-by-case basis.
2
1
Such a finding is interesting in light of the Legislative History that
reads:
The managers note that an "unwarrantable failure of the opera-
tor to comply" means the failure of an operator to abate a
violation he knew or should have known existed, or the failure
to abate a violation because of due diligence, or because of
indifference or lack of reasonable care, on the operator's part.'2
The Board, taking this paragraph into account in a footnote, inter-
preted the legislative history:
[T]he legislative history unmistakably suggests that a given
104(c) violation possesses the requisite degree of fault where, on
the basis of the evidentiary record, a reasonable man would
"I Eastern Associated Coal Corp., supra note 98, at 335, 1974-1975 CCH Occu-
pational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,604.
"2 Id. at 356, 1974-1975 CCH Occupational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,604.
"2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1030 (emphasis added).
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conclude that the operator intentionally or knowingly failed to
comply or demonstrated a reckless disregard for the health or
safety of the miners. '
The Board appears to have borrowed this language, with no reason
given, from the section 109(b) criminal provision of the Act.'24 The
demonstration of a reckless disregard requirement appears to be
the Board's own creation since no justification or source is given
and since the legislative history of the Act describes due diligence,
indifference, or lack of reasonable care as the standards. The defi-
nition arrived at by the Board is in error, is not justified, and is in
direct conflict with the legislative history's establishment of the
ordinary negligence standard.
5. The Elements
Further important questions on section 104(c) involve the ele-
ments of sections 104(c)(1) and 104(c)(2). First, once an inspector
has found the conditions that are sufficient to constitute a 104(c)
violation, and a 104(c) notice is issued, does a second violation
found within ninety days of the notice have to meet all the
requirements of the notice violation in order to justify issuing a
104(c) (1) order? Second, if a section 104(c)(1) withdrawal order has
been issued, and an additional violation has occurred, is it neces-
sary that a 104(c)(2) withdrawal order contain all the findings
required for a 104(c)(1) notice and withdrawal order? The Act
clearly indicates that only once is it necessary that the standard
established for the notice 104(c)(1) violation be met.
If during the same inspection or any subsequent inspections of
such mine within ninety days after the issuance of such notice,
an authorized representative of the Secretary finds another vio-
lation of any mandatory health or safety standard and finds
such violation to be also caused by an unwarrantable failure of
such operator to so comply, he shall forthwith issue an order
requiring. . . all persons. . . to be withdrawn. .. 11
As to the first question the elements for the 104(c)(1) order are
given in the direct language: there must be (1) within ninety days
of "notice" (2) another violation of any mandatory health or safety
standard, and (3) the violation must be caused by an unwarranta-
"I Eastern Associated Coal Corp., supra note 98, at 356, 1974-1975 CCH Occu-
pational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,604.
ISA Id. at footnote 8.
12 30 U.S.C. § 814(c)(1) (1970).
[Vol. 77
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ble failure by the operator. However, the Board in Eastern deter-
mined that the 104(c)(1) order must have not only the three ele-
ments listed in the Act but also must contain two additional ele-
ments of the section 104(c)(1) notice.' Thus, the Board's finding
in these two cases regarding the question of elements conflicts with
the clear language of the Act and with the intent of the section, as
well as the purpose of this section; the Board is plainly in error.
6. Lifting the 104(c)(2) Order
The last question presented is whether a spot inspection 21
which discloses no "similar" violation is sufficient to life a section
104(c)(2) order. The Board held:
Upon issuance of a valid section 104(c)(2) closure order, an
operator becomes subject to further such orders until a
completeln inspection of the mine discloses no "similar" viola-
tions. A spot inspection which discloses no "similar" violation
is insufficient, by itself, to lift continuing liability to closure. 2 1
This aspect of the Board's decision appears consistent with the
language of the Act and its purpose.
On February 10, 1975, the United Mine Workers filed a peti-
tion for review of the decision in Zeigler in the D.C. Circuit
Court;"' however, MESA sought and was granted reconsideration
by the Board of the decision. 1 ' Therefore, the question raised in
the Zeigler case remains unresolved.
7. Summary
The unwarrantable failure approach to mine safety has always
held out much promise for attacking directly the problem of an
unsafe attitude on the part of the mine operator. It was supposed
to put direct economic pressure on companies for their failure and
unwillingness to try and create safe and healthful mines. It was not
"I Eastern Associated Coal Corp., supra note 98, at 352, 1974-1975. CCH Occu-
pational Safety & Health Dec. at 22,602.
I" A spot inspection is a MESA inspection which is concerned with only one
portion of the mine or one particular problem or condition.
"I Under MESA, there are circumstances in which a series of spot inspectons
can add up to a complete inspection.
I" Ziegler Coal Co., supra note 99 at 335, CCH Occupational Safety & Health
Dec. at .
UMWA v. Morton, Appeal No. 75-1003, D.C. Cir., filed Feb. 10, 1975.
' Office of Hearings and Appeals Informational Bulletin, April 3, 1975.
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expected that all dangers and hazards would be eliminated imme-
diately, but it was thought that the unsafe and unwilling attitude
of some operators would be struck down. This is not the case in the
two decisions discussed above. The Board has committed such
grevious errors in its interpretations as to virtually eliminate the
104(c) provision as a serious tool for mine safety. One must con-
clude that as a result of the Eastern decision and the Zeigler ruling,
the continued use of section 104(c) as a viable tool of enforcement
for mine safety is in serious doubt.
VI. CRIMINAL SANCrIONS
The criminal sanctions of the Act are covered under section
109(b). They provide for a $25,000 fine or up to a year in jail for
willful violation of a standard or knowing violation of an order.'3
March 30, 1970, was the operative date of titles I and I of the Act.
Since that time, two cases have been prosecuted by the Justice
Department under this section.
The first case, United States v. Consolidation Coal Co.,'13 was
heard on July 9, 1973. All parties were ultimately dismissed. The
second prosecution grew from a disaster that occurred exactly one
year from the signing of the 1969 Act. A mine in eastern Kentucky
exploded on December 30, 1970, killing thirty-eight men. Two
cases grew out of that explosion. The company contended that two
of the regulations it was charged with violating'34 were not valid
because of the failure of MESA (then the Bureau of Mines) to
consult, under section 101(c), with industry, government, and
labor prior to the promulgation of these regulations.' 5 The District
Court granted defendants' motion to quash; an appeal was taken
to the Sixth Circuit where the lower court's decision was affirmed.
An appeal en banc was denied and a writ of certiorari was denied
in the Supreme Court. In the second round, United States v. Finley
Coal Co.,3' twenty-four additional courts against the defendant
operator have yet to be heard. These two cases represent the sum
total of the Department of the Interior's (then the Bureau of
Mines) criminal prosecution activity. Both of these cases were
132 30 U.S.C. § 819(b) (1970).
1- 504 F.2d 1330 (6th Cir. 1974).
,u 30 C.F.R. § 75.400-1 is a definitional section, and 30 C.F.R. § 75.400-2
requires a program for the clean-up of coal and coal dust.
30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1970).
493 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 77
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brought under special circumstances involving public pressure on
the Department.
On April 12, 1974, MESA finally established a Special Investi-
gation Division as part of the Coal Mine Safety Division.'37 This
division specifically deals with investigating potential criminal
violations under section 109 and making referrals to the Depart-
ment of Justice when appropriate. In its first year of operation, the
Division referred a total of five cases to the Justice Department for
prosecution. In two instances, the cases are being taken before
grand juries, and in the remaining three cases, the Justice
Department is preparing for prosecution. Currently, seventy-nine
cases are being actively investigated, with fifty-six cases disposed
of during 1974.138
An additional provision of the penalties section is section
109(c), involving individual civil penalties.'39 On May 1, 1974,
MESA filed its first case under this provision with the Office of
Hearings and Appeals. " ' Three other such cases are currently
under investigation. MESA describes these cases as those which
meet all the criteria of criminal penalties and are intentional viola-
tions, yet are not aggravated so as to meet the Justice Depart-
ment's criteria for criminal prosecution.
Despite the aforementioned statistics, the Department of the
Interior has failed to utilize the criminal penalty provisions of the
Act. Since March 30, 1970, the effective date of the Act, only seven
cases have been referred to the Justice Department for prosecu-
tion, and five of the seven have been referred in the last year. Only
two cases have been prosecuted, and no case has been successfully
argued by the government.
One concludes either that there is no criminal conduct that
might fall under sectionl09 or that there is criminal conduct, but
MESA and the Bureau of Mines have not considered section 109
to be within the Act and within their power. To resolve this ques-
tion, one simply needs to read the reports of fatal accidents, occur-
ring within the last four years or consider the numbers of closure
orders issued under section 104, particularly 104(c). Of the 16,683
I' Interview with Mark Savit, Director of the Special Investigation Division,
MESA, in Washington, D.C., May 11, 1975.
"3 Id.
13 30 U.S.C. § 819(c) (1970).
"I MESA v. Henshler, Office of Hearing and Appeals, Docket No. 75-3749.
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closure orders issued since March 20, 1970, it is quite logical to
assume that a considerable number of the violations would be
willful, and of the 3,432 section 104 closure orders, it would be
absurd to deny willfulness in many cases.'4'
Even to the uninitiated, it is apparent that MESA has more
than ample opportunity to investigate and prosecute successfully
under section 109, both criminally and civilly, but from the results
one must conclude it does not have the desire.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Many months have passed since the most recent mine disaster
left its victims scattered in the dust and across the headlines in
December, 1972. Those memories, like most unpleasant memories,
fade quickly, and when they are gone, we return to debating the
intricacies of enforcement procedures, alleged inspectors' abuses of
discretion, whether the appeal was properly filed and properly con-
sidered, and whether the due process rights of all the parties have
been protected.
Discussions now rage over the meaning of "unwarrantable fail-
ure" and "imminent danger," over what constitutes a violation,
what the amount of the penalty shall be, and whether the scope of
the Act includes a two-man mine. Briefs are written arguing
whether or not MESA is carrying out its mandate from Congress,
and numerous examples are used to show how the government has
failed in its duty or has overstepped its bounds. Perhaps these are
all necessary debates, because we live, after all, in a society of law,
and indeed, without this kind of discussion, how would we prog-
ress? Moreover, how would the rules by which mines are operated
be determined?
The problem with that approach, however, is that we are liv-
ing, in this instance, not simply under law but also on borrowed
time. We can debate the issue of how much accumulated coal dust
on a belt roller consitutes an imminent danger; we can debate the
application and restriction of the unwarrantable failure, and we
can question the use of an imminent danger closure order after a
fatality. As these debates continue, however, we are challenging a
law much more fundmental than the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969. We are challenging the law of averages. It
"I Statistics, supra note 53.
[Vol. 77
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has caught up with the coal industry before, and it will catch up
with the coal industry again. If in fact we cut comers, if we chill
the inspector's enthusiasm, and if we fail to pursue enforcement
aggressively, are we not then increasing the odds for catastrophe?
Are those odds not rough enough already?
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DISABLING INJURIES PER MILLION
MAN-HOURS WORKED
Eastern Associated Coal Corp.
Westmoreland Coal Co. 88.83
Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. 62.74
North American Coal Co. 58.79
National Average 29.22
Pittston Coal Co. 27.13
General Dynamics 24.80
Peabody Coal Co. 23.33
Old Ben Coal Co. 21.25
Island Creek Coal Co. 12.14
American Electric Power 11.34





Source: MESA, Statistical Analysis Branch
[Vol. 77
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